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The Quiet Reversal of U.S. Global 
Climate Change Policy 
Christopher Douglass and 
Murray Weidenbaum 
Introduction 
At the United Nation's global climate change 
conference in Geneva on July 17, 1996, State De-
partment officials suddenly reversed the U.S. 
government's long-standing policy on global climate 
change. Speaking before the Assembly of Delegates, 
Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs Timo-
thy E. Wirth announced, "The United States rec-
ommends that future negotiations focus on an 
agreement that sets a realistic, verifiable and bind-
ing medium-term emissions target" 1 (emphasis 
added). Until then, the United States had rejected 
compulsory emissions controls. 
Only 10 of the nation's 53 major daily newspa-
pers thought the announcement important enough 
to cover. 2 But, if government officials have their 
way, this sudden reversal in U.S. global climate 
change policy could dramatically affect the life of 
every American. After the debate ends, binding 
emissions standards could cost the United States 
enormous amounts of wealth and, perhaps, some of 
its sovereignty. 
If the more stringent proposals become inter-
national law, the United States' economic growth 
could slow to a crawl. An economic study spon-
sored by the Global Climate Coalition (an industry-
sponsored watchdog group) projects a 3 to 3.5 
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percent drag on the American economy, which has 
recently grown only around 2.5 percent a year. 3 
If America's corporations had to meet an inter-
national emissions standard, an international agency 
would be necessary to set the standard and to en-
force its implementation. Setting a just and equi-
table standard would prove an extremely difficult 
undertaking given the different economic circum-
stances and natural resources of each nation. State 
Department officials have publicly stated their doubt 
that a common measure could judiciously apply to 
all countries. 4 
The costs and benefits of greenhouse gas 
mitigation have yet to be properly 
debated by the American public and its 
governmental representatives. 
For the standard to be binding, this regulating 
agency must have the power to punish businesses, 
governments, and other organizations that fail to 
meet the targets. This is a frightening prospect for 
industries and localities that already wade through 
bureaucracies and regulations imposed by their own 
federal and state governments. If this new agenda 
were to become international law, a substantial 
amount of regulatory power would shift from indi-
vidual nations to a global governing agency. 
It might be argued, however, that the serious-
ness of the threat to the earth's ecosystem requires 
this tremendous cost. Perhaps the present genera-
tion has a responsibility to future generations to take 
these steps. This may, or may not be, the case. 
The costs and benefits of greenhouse gas mitigation 
have yet to be properly debated by the American 
public and its governmental representatives. The 
environmental and economic implications are too 
significant to let the issue be decided without sub-
stantial public debate. 
2 
History of Negotiations 
The global climate change issue is of fairly re-
cent origin. It was not until the late 1980s, when 
reports implicated human activity for the depletion 
of the ozone layer, that much of the public came to 
believe that human action could indeed affect the 
atmosphere. In 1988, the coupling of a Midwest-
ern drought and a congressional hearing chaired by 
then-U.S. Senator Timothy Wirth forced the issue 
to the fore. At that hearing, prominent climatolo-
gist James Hansen testified that he was "99 per-
cent" sure that global warming was occurring.5 
That same year, the United Nations and the 
World Meteorological Organization established the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 
They designed the IPCC to provide a "consensus" 
scientific perspective on global climate change and 
to scientifically inform the decisions of policymakers. 
In 1990, 154 nations organized themselves as the 
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) to 
develop a worldwide treaty in response to IPCC 
analyses of climate change. 6 
In 1992, environmental ministers meeting un-
der United Nations auspices produced a "treaty" 
document called the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (FCCC) at the U.N. Conference 
on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. 
That document has provided the foundation for all 
subsequent U.N. conferences on global climate 
change. To date 159 countries have signed the 
Framework Convention, including the United States. 
Approving the Framework Convention gives coun-
tries membership in the Conference of Parties which, 
in turn, gives them a seat at the table in future cli-
mate negotiations. 
The Framework Convention imposes two key 
stipulations on member nations. First, it calls for 
capping greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 levels. 
Second, it requires a periodic report on each nation's 
net emissions of greenhouse gases. The exact lan-
guage (Article 4) of the Framework Convention states, 
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Each of these Parties shall communicate . . . detailed 
information on . . . projected anthropogenic emis-
sions . . . with the aim of returning individually or 
jointly to their 1990 levels these anthropogenic emis-
sions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. 7 
Noticeably absent from this statement, and the en-
tire document, are both a time frame for attaining 
1990 emissions levels and mechanisms to enforce 
the emissions target. 
Domestic Action 
In response to the goal set forth in the Frame-
work Convention, the Clinton administration un-
veiled its $1.9 billion Climate Change Action Plan 
in October 1993. When introducing the plan on 
the White House lawn, President Clinton said, 
On Earth Day I made a commitment to reduce our 
emissions of greenhouse gases to 1990 levels by the 
year 2000 . . . . In concert with all other nations, 
we simply must halt global warming. It is a threat 
to our health, to our ecology and to our economy.8 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher has af-
firmed his department's role in supporting this glo-
bal environmental policy. In his Earth Day 1996 
address at Stanford University, he said: 
Our administration has recognized from the beginning 
that our ability to advance our global interests is 
inextricably linked to how we manage the Earth's 
resources. That is why we are determined to put 
environmental issues where they belong: in the 
mainstream of American foreign policy. 9 
Despite the strength of these statements from 
the Clinton administration, Under Secretary Wirth's 
stance at the Geneva Conference of Parties surprised 
both environmental groups and industry. Until that 
day, U.S. officials had resisted any measures be-
yond voluntary restrictions. 
In fact, just a month before the Geneva confer-
ence, a senior State Department official had denied 
even the possibility of universal standards and bind-
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ing emissions targets in his testimony before the 
House Subcommittee on Energy and Power. On 
June 19, 1996, Deputy Assistant Secretary for En-
vironment and Development Rafe Pomerance said, 
In our view, the significant differences in national 
circumstances and individual national approaches to 
these matters suggest that few, if any, individual 
measures are likely to be applicable to all countries 
. . . . We do not intend to make any quantitative 
commitments or support any policy measures. 10 
Less than a month later in Geneva, Under Sec-
retary Wirth reversed this position by announcing 
the U.S.'s support for a drastic new policy mea-
sure. Wirth declared, "Let me make clear the U.S. 
view: The science calls upon us to take urgent ac-
tion . . . . We believe that circumstances warrant 
the adoption of a realistic but binding target. " 11 
The Science 
The source of this compelling science is the 
IPCC's Second Assessment Report . Interestingly, 
this May 1996 report scales back projections of glo-
bal warming from the IPCC's 1990 Assessment 
Report. The 1990 report projected global warming 
of 3.5 to 8 degrees Celsius by the year 2050. The 
1996 assessment estimates a warming effect of 1. 8 
to 6.3 degrees Celsius by 2100_12 
However, the Second Assessment Report also 
contains a statement which has galvanized 
policymakers and to which Under Secretary Wirth 
appeals. The report states: 
Our ability to quantify the human influence on glo-
bal climate is currently limited because the expected 
signal is still emerging from the noise of natural vari-
ability, and because there are uncertainties in key 
factors. These include the magnitude and patterns 
of long-term natural variability and the time-evolv-
ing pattern of forcing by, and response to, changes in 
concentrations of greenhouse gases and aerosols, and 
land surface changes. Nevertheless, the balance of 
evidence suggests that there is a discernible human 
influence on global climate. (emphasis added)13 
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When the IPCC published this report, several 
prominent scientists cried, "Foul!" Led by Dr. 
Frederick Seitz, former president of the National 
Academy of Sciences, these critics claim that the 
leaders of the IPCC altered the technical report af-
ter it had garnered approval from its scientific board 
of advisors. 14 Dr. Benjamin D. Santer, lead author 
of the report, replied that the alterations were purely 
cosmetic, made only to provide a better summary 
for policymakers. Dr. Santer maintained that the 
essence and substance of the report was unchanged. 
At least 25 percent of experts believe, 
despite a lack of evidence, that 
global warming is occurring. 
Dr. Santer's response has not silenced the crit-
ics. They continue to claim that the "cosmetic" 
changes significantly altered the report. They note 
the deletion of such statements as, "None of the 
studies cited above has shown clear evidence that 
we can attribute the observed changes to the spe-
cific cause of increases in greenhouse gases." 15 
Moreover, in the final editing new statements were 
inserted, such as, "The observed trend in global 
mean temperature over the past 100 years is un-
likely to be entirely natural in origin. " 16 
The critics' charges raise special concern in view 
of the tendency of some scientists to overstate the 
threat of global warming. In 1991, the Gallup or-
ganization polled a random sample of 400 clima-
tologists and atmosphericists. Only a minority of 
those surveyed, 41 percent, agreed with the state-
ment that "currently available scientific evidence 
substantiates its [global warming's] occurrence. " 17 
Nevertheless, a clear majority of the respondents, 
66 percent, affirmed their belief in the occurrence 
of global warming. Thus, at least 25 percent of these 
experts believe, despite a lack of evidence, that glo-
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hal warming is occurring. Apparently, even scien-
tists are swayed by nonscientific beliefs. 
Why would such a large percentage of scien-
tists respond in this nonscientific way? A benign 
explanation is that taking such a position represents 
the triumph of the heart over the mind. Another 
theory is that of Dr. Richard S. Lindzen, a distin-
guished astrophysicist at M .1. T., who notes that 
potential financial support encourages many scien-
tists to support the global warming theory. He says 
that this bias is "unconscious" and even "natural. "18 
Seitz and his colleagues at the George Marshall 
Institute offered a similar explanation before the 
House Committee on Science, saying: 
Fundamental research on global climate change can 
become entangled with the temptation to support pre-
ordained answers that may be linked to the process 
of securing continuing funding. This perversion of 
the scientific process could undermine the most im-
portant element of research in global climate change: 
obtaining the best affordable research on the funda-
mental physics of global climate. 19 
Harvard planetary scientist Charles L. Harper, 
Jr. contends that, "the scientific 'consensus' the 
[IPCC] report presents may have more to do with 
the politics of fear than with objective science. "20 
This wide-ranging criticism of the IPCC report calls 
into question the supposed "scientific consensus" 
that the report is designed to provide. 
The Geneva Conference of Parties, 
july 1996 
The Geneva Conference of Parties in July 1996 
used the 1996 IPCC report as its scientific founda-
tion. After 10 days of deliberations, the conference 
produced a two-page ministerial declaration which 
endorses the IPCC report and affirms the need for 
binding timetables. The declaration garnered ap-
proval by a large majority of participating nations 
but was never put to a vote. 
Fourteen nations, many of them members of 
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the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), vociferously contested the ministerial dec-
laration due to its affirmation of the IPCC report 
and its stance on binding emissions targets. 21 The 
ministerial declaration uses the IPCC report's lan-
guage to state, "The balance of evidence suggests a 
discernible human influence on global climate. "22 
United States delegates played a large part in 
writing the declaration, but some U.S. officials de-
sired an even stronger statement. Assistant Secre-
tary of State Eileen Claussen stated, 
[The U.S.] wholeheartedly endorses this declaration 
and agrees that we must now move faster and set 
legally binding targets in Kyoto [location of the next 
Conference of Parties meeting]. We could have gone 
farther. 23 
Emboldened by the IPCC report and the near 
consensus of support, ministers called on their gov-
ernments to "instruct their representatives to accel-
erate negotiations on the text of a legally-binding 
protocol or another legal instrument to be completed 
in due time for adoption at tt. ~ third session of the 
Conference of the Parties [in December 1997]. "24 
Emission Reduction Costs 
A legally binding protocol to restrict carbon 
emissions, whatever its form, will have substantial 
impacts on the American economy. Economist 
William Nordhaus of Yale University estimates that 
emissions stabilization at 1990 levels, as proposed 
by the Framework Convention, would generate a 
net discounted cost of $7 trillion. 25 
Dr. Lawrence Horwitz of the economic con-
sulting firm DRI/McGraw Hill analyzed the annual 
economic effect of greenhouse gas mitigation. He 
estimates that a carbon tax of $100 a ton, which 
could lower emissions levels to near 1990 levels, 
would cost the American economy $203 billion each 
year. According to his calculations, a $200-a-ton 
carbon tax (which would ensure emissions below 
1990 levels) would cost the American economy 4.2 
8 
percent of its gross domestic product, or $350 bil-
lion a year in reduced production of goods and ser-
vices. 
Some of the most significant effects cannot be 
expressed in dollar terms. For example, Horwitz 
projects that 520,000 jobs would be lost each year 
from 1995 to 2010 under a $100-a-ton carbon tax. 
Under a carbon tax of $200 a ton, the American 
economy would lose an average of 1.1 million jobs 
annually over that 15-year period. 26 
If a carbon tax fell solely on 
industrialized nations and not on 
developing nations, total worldwide 
greenhouse gas emissions would be 
likely to rise, not fall. 
Some proposals seek to limit greenhouse gas 
emissions even further. The Alliance of Small Is-
land States (AOSIS) believes that its member coun-
tries will face grave danger from rising ocean levels 
if global warming occurs. Therefore, they have pro-
posed that by 2005 developed countries stabilize 
their emissions at 20 percent below 1990 levels. To 
accomplish this aim, carbon taxes would need to be 
in excess of $280 a ton. According to economic 
consultants for the Global Climate Coalition, this 
would cost the U.S. economy $262 billion to $305 
billion each year. 27 
Whichever means of curtailing carbon emissions 
is used, limiting emissions will degrade living stan-
dards. Moreover, if a carbon tax fell solely on in-
dustrialized nations and not on developing nations, 
as is currently the plan in every protocol before the 
Framework Convention, total worldwide greenhouse 
gas emissions would be likely to rise, not fall. If 
emission reduction standards become law in indus-
trialized nations, total consumption of carbon-emit-
ting goods will fall. Thus, the price of goods such 
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as oil is likely to substantially decline on the world 
market. However, the lower prices of these goods 
would encourage poorer developing countries - with 
much less fuel efficient technology - to increase 
their use of fossil fuels, resulting in a net increase 
in greenhouse gas emissions. 28 
Moreover, as the world becomes increasingly 
industrialized over the next century, the United 
States' share of greenhouse gas emissions is expected 
to shrink from 20 percent to 10 percent. Econo-
mists estimate that by the year 2100 the developing 
countries of the world will be emitting three-quar-
ters of the earth's greenhouse gases. 29 
Yet the current deliberations on global warm-
ing policy ignore these facts. The United Kingdom's 
most recent proposal states, 
We believe that agreement by developed countries to 
reduce total greenhouse gas emissions by a figure in 
the range of 5-10 percent below the 1990 base year 
by 2010 would be a credible and appropriate outcome 
of the Berlin Mandate process. 30 
The developing countries of the world continue to 
bear no responsibilities under these protocols. 
Under the Berlin Mandate, adopted in April 
1995 by the major industrialized countries, respon-
sibility to stop greenhouse gas emissions is mark-
edly different for developed than for developing 
countries. The developed, industrialized nations 
(known as "Annex 1 Participants to the Framework 
Convention") are the 27 members of the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) plus the former Communist bloc countries. 
Developing countries have no binding commitments 
at all. Proposals that ignore the role of developing 
countries will place severe economic strains on de-
veloped nations while achieving negligible net de-
creases in worldwide emission levels. 
Should We Buy "Greenhouse Insurance?" 
The Geneva Ministerial Declaration states that 
the IPCC's report "provides a scientific basis for 
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urgently strengthening action at the global, regional 
and national levels. "31 Indeed, it seems intuitive 
that action should be taken now against this colos-
sal threat. Yet there are important reasons to pro-
ceed with caution. A study by Douglas Holtz-Eakin 
and Thomas Selden of Syracuse University finds 
that the marginal propensity to emit carbon shrinks 
as economies grow and develop. According to their 
report, if economies continue to grow at their present 
rates, the annual emissions growth will fall from its 
1955-85 average of 3.2 percent a year to 1.8 per-
cent annually for the period 1990-2025.32 Thus, 
any efforts which limit economic growth unwittingly 
slow down progress toward carbon emissions re-
duction. 
And a report by T. Wigley, R. Richels, and J. 
Edmonds in the scientific journal Nature notes that 
it is far less costly to allow emissions to rise for a 
decade or more prior to restricting greenhouse gas 
emissions. They give three reasons for their con-
clusion: 
1. Positive marginal productivity of capital. With 
the economy yielding a positive return on capital, 
the further in the future an economic burden (here, 
emissions reduction) lies, the smaller is the set 
of resources that must be set aside today to fmance 
the burden. 
2. Capital Stock. Stock for energy production and 
use is typically long-lived (for example, power 
plant, housing and transport). . . . Time is 
therefore needed to reoptimize the capital stock. 
3. Technical progress. There is ample evidence for 
past and potential improvements in the efficiency 
of energy supply, transformation and end-use 
technologies. Thus, the availability of low-carbon 
substitutes will probably improve and their costs 
drop over time. 33 
Some scientists agree that to act immediately 
and urgently, as the Ministerial Declaration advo-
cates, would be premature. William Nierenberg of 
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the Scripps Institute of Oceanography said in testi-
mony before the Subcommittee on Energy and En-
vironment of the House Committee on Science , 
There is no question in my mind that the current 
anthropogenic growth of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere is bound to influence climate ... [but] 
one can now safely wait . . . before taking action. 34 
Conclusion 
The United States is backing into a basic change 
in its global warming policy without the national 
debate that an issue of this magnitude warrants. A 
speech by an under secretary of state is hardly the 
appropriate vehicle for a polar shift in governmen-
tal policy on such a major issue. 
Congressional committees with appropriate ju-
risdiction should immediately schedule intensive 
hearings on the sudden shift in official United States 
global warming policy. 
Several key points deserve substantial public 
airing: 
1. Does the degree of scientific certainty about 
the threat of global warming outweigh the 
heavy costs carbon-mitigation efforts will 
impose on the American economy? 
2. Has the administration carefully examined 
the economic consequences of its global 
warming policy? Effects on economic 
growth, employment, inflation, international 
competition, income distribution, regional 
economics, and specific industries each re-
quire study. 
3. Has the administration determined how it 
will limit greenhouse gas emissions? What 
specific mechanisms will be used? 
4. What was the basis for the dramatic shift in 
policy? What policy process or procedure 
was followed? 
Americans should have the opportunity to hear 
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a well-ordered debate on global climate change be-
fore a treaty is established. Because the U.S. del-
egation is the driving force behind these negotiations, 
the public and its congressional representatives 
should have a hand in guiding the process. 
To this end, Congress should hold intensive 
hearings soon, preferably prior to the next meeting 
of the Ad-Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate in De-
cember 1996, at which time the specific restric-
tions are likely to be put forth. Certainly such 
hearings should be held before the next Conference 
of Parties meeting in December 1997. Merely to 
state that Congress would have the opportunity to 
rule on a final version of a treaty is unsatisfactory 
because it will then be too late to modify the agree-
ment. At that late stage, Congress would be limited 
to an up or down vote. 
International global climate change policy is 
likely to have more widespread effects on the people 
and the economy of the United States than many of 
the issues that now occupy a more central stage in 
Washington. Congress should act now to frame and 
to guide the international debate on global climate 
change before international agreements become set 
in the stone of international law. 
13 
Notes 
1. The Honorable Timothy E. Wirth, under secre-
tary for global affairs on behalf of the United 
States of America, Second Conference of the 
Parties, Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Geneva, Switzerland, July 17, 1996, 
Final- As Delivered, p. 4. 
2. The authors conducted a search of Nexis-Lexis's 
"major paper index" which contains 53 Ameri-
can newspaper dailies (according to a telephone 
interview conducted August 2, 1996 with a Nexis-
Lexis researcher). 
3. Mary Novak, Viji Padmanabhan, James 
Marchetti, "A Review of the Economic Impacts 
of AOSIS-Type Proposals to Limit Carbon Di-
oxide Emissions" (Washington, D. C.: Global 
Climate Coalition, May 30, 1996), p. 2. 
4 . Federal Document Clearing House Congressional 
Testimony, "Testimony June 19, 1996, Rafe 
Pomerance, deputy assistant secretary for envi-
ronment and development, U.S. Department of 
State House Commerce Energy and Power Glo-
bal Climate Change Negotiations," p. 4. 
5. Susan Cohen, "The Warm Zone," Washington 
Post Magazine, July 16, 1995, p. W17. 
6. Climate Watch, Vol. 1, Issue 6, May 1993, p. 1. 
7. Anthropogenic emissions are emissions produced 
by human activity; Article 4, Section 2 (b), 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992. 
8. White House Press Release, "Remarks by the 
President at White House Conference on Cli-
mate Change," October 19, 1993. 
9. Address by Secretary of State Warren Christo-
pher, "American Diplomacy and the Global En-
vironmental Challenges of the 21st Century" 
(Stanford University, April 9, 1996), p. 1. 
10. Rafe Pomerance, p. 4; Reuters NewMedia, 
"House Lawmakers Blast U.S. Climate Change 
Strategy," June 20, 1996. 
11. Wirth, pp. 1, 5. 
14 
12. "Geneva: COP II - Framework Convention on 
Climate Change," Eco-logic, July/August 1996, 
p. 12. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Frederick Seitz, "A Major Deception on 'Glo-
bal Warming,'" Wall Street Journal, June 12, 
1996. 
15. William K. Stevens, "U.N. Climate Report Was 
Improperly Altered, Overplaying Human Role, 
Critics Say," New York Times, June 17, 1996. 
16. James M. Sheehan, "Global Warming Controversy: 
Hot Politics," CEI UpdaJe, July 1996, p. 5. 
17. "Global Warming: What the Experts Say- What 
the Media Reports," (Washington, D. C.: Cen-
ter for Science, Technology and Media), Febru-
ary 21, 1992. 
18. William K. Stevens, "A Skeptic Asks, Is It Get-
ting Hotter or Is It Just the Computer?" New 
York Times, June 18, 1996, p. B5. 
19. U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Sci-
ence, "Report on NASA Authorization Act, Fis-
cal Year 1996," August 4, 1995. 
20. Charles L. Harper, Jr. , "Tune to Phase Out Fossil 
Fuels?" Wall Street Journal, December 26, 
1995, p. A6. 
21 . "Climate Change: Progress at Geneva Conference 
But No Targets," Europe Energy, No. 474, July 
26, 1996. 
22. United Nations, Second Conference of the Par-
ties to the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change, "Ministerial 
Declaration," July 18, 1996. 
23. John Parry and James Kennedy, "Climate 
Change: Conference Approves Declaration Es-
tablishing Legally Binding Objectives," BNA 
National Environment Daily, July 19, 1996. 
24. "Ministerial Declaration," July 18, 1996. 
25. William D. Nordhaus, Managing the Global 
Commons (Boston: MIT Press, 1994), p. 82. 
15 
26. Lawrence M. Horwitz, "The Impact of Carbon 
Dioxide Emission Reductions on Living Stan-
dards and Lifestyles," American Council for 
Capital Formation, Center for Policy Research 
Special Report, October 1995, pp. 2-3 . 
27. Mary Novak, p. 2. Calculations of this nature, 
whether by Nordhaus, Horwitz, or others, are 
bound to vary because they depend on making 
assumptions about future responses, such as in-
terest rates and the speed of technological ad-
vancement, which are unknowable at present. 
28. For another discussion of the costs of mitiga-
tion, see Michael A. Toman, John Firor, and 
Joel Darmstadter, "Climate Change and Its Con-
sequences," Resources (Resources for the Fu-
ture), Summer 1996, pp. 10-13. 
29. W. David Montgomery, "Developing a Frame-
work for Short- and Long-Run Decisions on Cli-
mate Change Policies," ACCF Center for Policy 
Research, October 1995. 
30. Paper No.7, United Kingdom submission to the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
"Quantified Emission Limitation and Reduction 
Objectives for Inclusion in a Protocol or An-
other Legal Instrument. " 
31. "Ministerial Declaration," July 18, 1996. 
32. Douglas Holtz-Eakin and Thomas M. Selden, 
"Stoking the Fires? C02 Emissions and Eco-
nomic Growth," Maxwell School of Citizenship 
and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, Occa-
sional Paper No. 159, December 1992, pp. 4-5. 
33. T.M.L. Wigley, R. Richels & J.A. Edmonds, 
"Economic and Environmental Choices in the 
Stabilization of Atmospheric C02 Concentra-
tions," Nature, Vol. 379, January 18, 1996, p. 
242. 
34. David Applegate, "Global Climate Change Hear-
ing 11-16-95," American Geological Institute 
Government Affairs Program, December 1, 
1995. 
16 
